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legal and legislative issues

Race-Based Preferences
and the Supreme Court
Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.

The legal status
of race-conscious
remedies present
challenges for
education leaders,
policymakers, and
lawmakers.
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S

o-called race-conscious remedies
ensure that all citizens are considered fairly and equally for employment and education opportunities.
The legal status of race-conscious remedies
continues to present challenges for education leaders, policymakers, and lawmakers.
For example, in a recent case, Schuette
v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
(2014), a fractured Supreme Court upheld a
state constitutional amendment prohibiting
the use of race in a variety of public arenas.
As author of the opinion on behalf of
the three-member plurality of the Supreme
Court, including Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy began by
establishing that “[t]he Court in this case
must determine whether an amendment
to the Constitution of the State of Michigan, approved and enacted by its voters, is
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” (p. 1629).
In examining the facts, Justice Kennedy
pointed out that Schuette arose largely as a
response to the 2003 companion cases Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger which
upheld and invalided, respectively, the use
of affirmative action plans in admissions
programs at the University of Michigan.
Unhappy with these cases, citizens initiated
a 2006 ballot proposal called Proposal 2,
which passed by a margin of 58% to 42%.
The enactment became an amendment to
the Michigan Constitute and in broad terms
states in Section 26 that the state (which
includes “any public college, university, or
community college, school district”) “shall
not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group
on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public

employment, public education, or public
contracting.”
Critics of Proposal 2 quickly filed suit
claiming that the State of Michigan unfairly
disadvantaged those who sought to use the
political process via a ballot initiative to
mandate racial preferences. However, a federal trial court granted the state’s motions
for summary judgment (BAMN v. Regents
of University of Michigan 2008a) and
later denied a motion for reconsideration
(BAMN v. Regents of University of Michigan, 2008b).
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit invalidated
Proposal 2 on the ground that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying minorities the
opportunity to engage in the political lives
of their communities (BAMN v. Regents of
University of Michigan 2011). An en banc
panel of the Sixth Circuit, on further review,
in an eight-to-seven judgment, agreed that
Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Relying on the political process
doctrine, the court contended that insofar
as structures such as Proposal 2 that are
designed to impose “special burdens on the
ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation” (BAMN v. Regents of
University of Michigan, 2012, p. 474) are
subject to strict scrutiny, the highest level of
analysis, it was unconstitutional.
Prior to Schuette, a similar dispute arose
in California with the opposite result.
The Ninth Circuit upheld another voterapproved initiative, Proposal 209, under
which “(a) The state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting”
(Coalition for Affirmative Action v. Brown
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2012, p, 1132). In light of this split
between the circuits, the Supreme
Court granted the State of Michigan’s appeal (Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action, 2013)
and reversed in its favor.

Supreme Court Opinions
PLURALITY

At the outset of his rationale, Justice
Kennedy pointed out that “[b]efore
the Court addresses the question
presented, it is important to note
what this case is not about. It is not
about the constitutionality, or the
merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education”
(p. 1630). Recognizing that raceconscious admissions plans present
complex questions, he indicated that
the dispute did not disturb the permissible use of race in some circumstances. Rather, Kennedy repeated
a theme that ran throughout his
judgment: the dispute was not over
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the permissible use of such policies
in admissions but whether and how
state voters can elect to forbid governmental officials from using race
in education and other arenas.
Justice Kennedy chided the Sixth
Circuit for unnecessarily extending
the rationale of one of the Supreme
Court’s earlier judgments, Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1 (1982). In Seattle the Court
ruled that insofar as a voter initiative impermissibly classified persons
due to race in attempting to end
mandatory bussing to achieve racial
integration, it violated the equal
protection rights of minority students. Kennedy thus explained that
it was necessary to review a trilogy
of Supreme Court cases culminating
in Seattle because of their impact on
Schuette.
In Reitman v. Mulkey (1967)
the Supreme Court invalidated an
amendment to California’s constitution that attempted to prohibit the
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state legislature from interfering
with the rights of property owners
to rent or sell to others regardless
of their reasons. The Mulkey Court
struck down the amendment in
viewing it as involving the state in
private acts of discrimination.
In Hunter v. Erickson (1969), the
Supreme Court vitiated an amendment to a city charter in Ohio that
obligated city council ordinances
regulating specified real estate transactions on basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry to
be approved by a majority of voters.
In ordering public officials to enforce
fair-housing mandates, the Court
rejected the ordinance as placing an
unfair burden on minorities in what
it described as the “governmental
process” (p. 562).
Returning to Seattle, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the disputed
voter initiative that sought to end
mandatory bussing was part of a
settlement agreement designed to
reduce racial imbalances even absent
a finding of de jure segregation. Yet,
in Seattle, the Justices rejected the
initiative because it would have violated the Equal Protection Clause by
burdening the interests of minorities.
Justice Kennedy criticized the
analyses of both the Supreme Court
in Seattle and the Sixth Circuit as
exceeding the boundaries needed to
resolve Schuette in pursuit of protecting the interests of minorities.
He voiced a key concern that the
over-reliance by the lower courts
on Seattle may have validated racial
divisions by disempowering voters
from adopting courses of permissible action forbidding race-based
preferences.
Justice Kennedy reasoned that
unlike Mukley, Hunter, and Seattle,
Schuette did not focus on how
to redress injuries based on race.
Rather, he added that Schuette was
concerned with whether voters
could decide the future of race-based
preferences. In so doing, Justice
Kennedy indicated that Michigan
voters enacted a state constitutional
asbointl.org
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amendment bypassing public officials whom they deemed unresponsive to their concerns.
Aware of the need for free and
open debate remain on sensitive
issues, Justice Kennedy posited that
invalidating Proposal 2 would have
impeded and demeaned the democratic process by presuming that
voters were incapable of resolving
important issues of policy decently
and reasonably. He suggested that
citizens have the right, and duty, to
engage in such discourse consistent
with their free speech rights under
the First Amendment.
Rounding out his rationale, Justice Kennedy reiterated that Mukley,
Hunter, and Seattle were inapplicable in Schuette because they involved
the use of governmentally imposed
political restrictions that may have
caused harm based on race. Instead,
Kennedy wrote that in Schuette
the issue was whether voters could
instruct the government to eschew
a course of action in relying on race
in a manner they deemed unwise
due to fears that it could lead to
resentment and hostility. He specified that although the fears voiced
by the majority of voters may not
have come to pass about race based
preferences, the issue is subject to
debate.
In sum, Justice Kennedy determined that Schuette “is not about
how the debate about racial preferences should be resolved. It is about
who may resolve it” (p. 1638).
He thus concluded that insofar
as democracy allows debate over
sensitive issues such as racial preferences, this was a matter best left to
the will of the voters in the State of
Michigan.
CONCURRENCES

Chief Justice Roberts. The Chief
Justice devoted his two paragraph
concurrence to rebutting 11 pages
of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent which
argued in favor of racial preferences
in higher education. To this end,
Roberts pointedly responded to
asbointl.org

Justice Sotomayor that if anything,
racial preferences “have the debilitating effect of reinforcing precisely
that doubt [about whether minority
students truly belong on campuses],
and—if so—that the preferences
do more harm than good” (pp.
1638-39).
Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia’s
concurrence, joined by Justice
Thomas, wondered whether, in
light of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, those who voted to end racial
preferences could, paradoxically,
have been accused of discrimination
even as they sought equal treatment
for all regardless of race. He would
have gone further than the Court
by overturning both Hunter and
Seattle while disavowing the political
process doctrine and its reliance on
race-conscious remedies.
Justice Breyer. In his three-page
concurrence, Justice Breyer agreed
that insofar as Proposal 2 afforded
voters, rather than non-elected
campus officials, decision making over racial preferences, it was
constitutional.
DISSENT

Justice Sotomayor’s 27-page dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, was

about three times the length of the
plurality. Her main point seemed
to be that public officials essentially
should be free to discriminate based
on race by providing special advantages to minority groups, despite
the wishes of the majority of voters
grounded on the notion that “race
matters” (p. 1676).

Discussion
It is important to recognize that less
than a majority of Justices joined in
the Supreme Court’s judgment in
Schuette—resulting in the plurality.
Accordingly, Schuette is of limited
precedential value because it is binding only on the parties in a suit and,
here, the Sixth Circuit, which consists of Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky,
and Tennessee.
Yet, to the extent that Schuette
is a decision of the Supreme Court,
education leaders, regardless where
they work and live, must be mindful of its holding because it is some
indication of where the Justices may
be headed on racial preferences and
particularly with regard to the political process doctrine.
As broad-based as Proposal 2 is,
though, touching on a variety of
public programs, as is often the case
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in disputes involving race-conscious
remedies, Schuette leaves more questions unresolved than answered.
The lack of clarity resulting from
Schuette is mostly because the plurality limited its order to acknowledging that states may allow voters
to forbid the use of race in specified
circumstances but are not obligated
to do so.
Post-Schuette uncertainty is likely
to lead to additional litigation insofar
as the Supreme Court stopped short
of resolving the ultimate question of
whether race-based preferences in
education and other areas of public
life are acceptable under the Equal
Protection Clause. Consequently,
to the extent that education leaders
may wish to take race into account
in such areas as student assignments
and hiring, Schuette seems to make
these tasks more difficult because the
rules are not entirely clear.
Amid disputes over the future of
race-conscious remedies, an interesting dynamic in Schuette was the
interplay between the members
of the Supreme Court over the
appropriateness of race-conscious
remedies, especially as they play
out in education under the guise of
the political process doctrine. As in
many other areas such as religion,
the tension between the Justices

continues to represent a deep divide
on the High Court bench.
Perhaps the key outcome of
Schuette is that if one combines the
votes of the members of the plurality with Justice Scalia’s concurrence,
which was joined by Justice Thomas,
a bare majority of the Supreme
Court seems to be willing to eliminate the political process doctrine. If
the Court were to move away from
this doctrine, it may make it easier
for those who disfavor programs
designed to afford race-based preferences in education and other public
arenas to initiate legal challenges.
At the bottom line, it may be that
the most significant outcome of
Schuette is that it might make it easier
for those who question the appropriateness of racial preferences to challenge such remedies that are designed
to reach the elusive goal of equity
by calling for laws and policies to
enhance opportunities for all regardless of race. Still, it remains to be seen
whether this will come to pass.

Conclusion
Insofar as issues involving race
remain highly charged, the pursuit
of equity has become a seemingly
unending saga that is not much
closer to resolution as a result of
Schuette. Thus, although Schuette

may signal the demise of the political
process doctrine, the final quest for
racial equity is far from over.
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TRADITIONAL (SCOREKEEPER) CFO VS STRATEGIC CFO
Scorekeeper CFO
 Number cruncher
 “Dr. No” on spending
 Risk manager
 Reporting and compliance hawk
 Bank or funder of others’ priorities
 Book balancer
 Cost cutter

Strategic CFO
 Capacity builder: Educates and communicates with district leadership and the community about cost drivers and
trade-offs
 Value champion: Furthers value and best return for dollars
invested by promoting a return-on-investment process that
assesses how all district resources are aligned with priorities
 Strategic partner: Teams with the chief academic officer, or
CAO, to integrate financial and instructional perspectives
 Planner: Looks long term and addresses sustainability
 Strategist: Makes the budget a tool for accomplishing strategic goals

From The New Education CFO: From Scorekeeper to Strategic Leader. 2014. The Center for American Progress.
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